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UNITED STATES V. SCHAEFER AND UNITED STATES V. STURM:
WHY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REGULATE
ALL INTERNET USE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
ABSTRACT
Technology is always evolving and at an ever-increasing rate. This
evolution leaves the law playing catch-up, with courts left to apply exist-
ing laws to new realities. The rapid growth and adoption of the Internet is
a prime example, leaving some courts and prosecutors at odds with
which laws Internet crimes should be tried under. . Should Internet use,
by itself, constitute interstate commerce, thereby invoking federal juris-
diction? This question is explored by reviewing two child pornography
cases decided by the Tenth Circuit: United States v. Schaefer and United
States v. Sturm, and the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
In 2007, an admitted possessor of child pornography was acquitted
by the Tenth Circuit, which held that proof of child pornography materi-
als moving across state lines was required for a conviction under the fed-
eral child pornography laws. This ruling by the Tenth Circuit contradict-
ed several decisions from other federal circuits, which held that proof of
Internet use alone in connection with child pornography was enough for
a conviction. Seeking to clarify the intent of the child pornography laws,
Congress passed the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of
2007 (ECPPA). The ECPPA declared that use of the Internet to receive,
possess, and distribute child pornography fell under Congress's Com-
merce Clause powers.
Following the enactment of the ECPPA, the Tenth Circuit was again
asked to interpret the federal child pornography laws in United States v.
Sturm. Interpreting the same child pornography laws applicable in
Schaefer, the court overruled its Schaefer decision, ultimately leading to
a conviction in Sturm. These two inconsistent rulings reveal the difficul-
ties that courts have in interpreting existing laws to new technology. This
Comment urges Congress to act proactively, rather than reactively as it
did with the ECPPA, by declaring that Internet use constitutes interstate
commerce for all federal laws, and contends that such a declaration is
within Congress's Commerce Clause powers.
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INTRODUCTION
Confess to a crime and punishment follows-not always. Enter the
Tenth Circuit decisions of United States v. Schaefer' and United States v.
Sturm.2 In Schaefer, the defendant admitted to searching for child por-
nography on the Internet;3 however, the confession was not enough to
uphold a conviction.4 The Schaefer court held that the Government did
not carry its burden of proof because it failed to establish that porno-
graphic images had ever traveled across state lines. Congress responded
to the Schaefer decision by enacting the Effective Child Pornography
Prosecution Act of 2007 (ECPPA) to give federal prosecutors the full
reach of the Commerce Clause by amending the statute to read "in or
affecting commerce." 6 Following the ECPPA, the Tenth Circuit over-
turned its decision in Schaefer, holding that the term "visual depiction"
contained in federal child pornography statutes meant the "substantive
content" of the image contained on the tangible media.7 Although the
Sturm decision led to a conviction,' it was far from clear-cut.
1. 501 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
2. 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
3. Schaefer,501 F.3dat 1198.
4. Id. at 1207.
5. Id.
6. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 103, 122
Stat. 4001 (2008) (codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C.).
7. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901. "Visual depiction," or the "substantive content" of the image,
means the thing that is portrayed within the file or photograph, and is only created once. For exam-
ple, say you take a picture of your new car using your digital camera. The moment you snap a pho-
tograph of your new car, you have created a visual depiction of your new car. Making a copy of this
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In passing the ECPPA, Congress clearly intended that anybody who
used the Internet in connection with child pornography be punished.9 Did
Congress go too far? Has the Internet become such an interstate activity
that the federal government should have free reign to prosecute all cy-
bercrime? This Comment argues that Congress has reacted appropriately
by equating Internet use to interstate commerce, and that this broader
commerce definition based on Internet usage should be applied to all
federal laws.
Although the cases of Schaefer and Sturm both involve crimes re-
lated to child pornography,' 0 this Comment will look beyond that con-
text. This Comment will use the decisions in Schaefer and Sturm as a
platform to discuss issues with regulating the Internet like traditional
methods of communication, in an effort to show that Congress's move to
declare use of the Internet as interstate commerce in the child pornogra-
phy statutes should be adopted in all federal laws. Part I of this Comment
will look at the development of the child pornography laws and why a
change was needed. Part II will analyze why treating all Internet use as
interstate commerce does not violate the Constitution, and why it falls
within the powers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Part III will discuss the benefits of adopting a policy that classifies Inter-
net use as interstate commerce. This Comment will conclude that a clear
mandate from Congress to adopt such a policy for all Internet use will
provide a straightforward answer to all courts and citizens, and such a
policy is the only way to effectively prosecute those criminals who use
the Internet as their weapon of choice.
I. EvoLuTiON OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS
A. A Brief History
The early child pornography statutes were enacted prior to the In-
ternet becoming a part of everyday life." In passing these early statutes,
Congress realized the dangers to society that child pornography present-
ed.12 Recognizing this, Congress sought to remedy the problem by pass-
photograph does not create a new visual depiction; it simply creates a copy of the visual depiction.
This visual depiction may be saved in a digital file on your camera or computer. Although the digital
file is the media that you can share with friends and family via e-mail, social networks, etc., the
substantive content of that digital file is the picture or image of your new car that you see when you
view the file on your camera or open the digital file on your computer screen.
8. United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012).
9. See id; see also David M. Frommell, Comment, Pedophiles, Politics, and the Balance of
Power: The Fallout from United States v. Schaefer and the Erosion of State Authority, 86 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1155, 1166(2009).
10. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 892; Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1197.
11. Frommell, supra note 9, at 1156-58 (discussing the history of the child pornography
statutes beginning with the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 through
the first child pornography statute to address computer use in the Child Protection Act of 1988).
12. Michael D. Yanovsky Sukenik, Distinct Words, Discrete Meanings: The Internet & Illicit
Interstate Commerce, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 7.
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ing legislation that would stop child pornography from spreading using
"instrumentalities of interstate ... commerce." By 1988, Congress saw
the dangerous potential that new technology, such as computers and the
Internet, could play in the spread of child pornography.14 As a result,
Congress amended the Child Protection Act of 1984 by prohibiting any
"knowing transportation, shipment, receipt or distribution of child por-
nography ... by any means, including by computer." 5 It is under this
version of the statute that we begin our review of the case law.
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Schaefer, many other circuits
were asked to interpret the language of the child pornography statutes.16
In each of these earlier cases, the interpretation by the federal courts of
appeals reached the same conclusion-Internet use constituted interstate
commerce. '7 The Schaefer court, however, decided to rule differently,' 8
arguably going against congressional intent.' 9
In Schaefer, the district court convicted the defendant for possession
of child pornography based in part on evidence that he had subscribed to
websites that contained images of child pornography.20 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, reversed the district court's conviction, holding that the
Government failed to prove actual "movement across state lines."2' Re-
jecting the view of the other circuits, 22 the Tenth Circuit required clear
evidence that the images of child pornography possessed by Schaefer had
in fact "moved across state lines."23 The court reasoned that the plain
language of the statute supported its ruling.24 The Tenth Circuit's ruling,
however, allowed Schaefer to escape conviction, even though he had
13. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-438, at 5 (1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, § 2252, 92
Stat. 7 (1978) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2259 (2012)) (regulating any "visual or print medium"
that depicts child pornography).
14. See Frommell, supra note 9, at 1158.
15. Id (citing Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53, 2423 (2012)).
16. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that use of the
Internet is sufficient evidence to show interstate activity); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223,
242 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[C]ircumstantial evidence linking a[n] ... image to the Internet . . . can be
sufficient evidence of interstate transportation . . . ."); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742
(1st Cir. 1997) ("Transmission .. . by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving ... across state
lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.").
17. See cases cited supra note 16; see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1 64-65.
18. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled by United
States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
19. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14.
20. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198.
21. Id.
22. See cases cited supra note 16; see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1165.
23. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at I 198.
24. Id. at 1207 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and § 2252(a)(4)(B) require "movement
across state lines").
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confessed to searching for child pornography on the Internet.25 This out-
26come outraged Congress, prompting an immediate reaction.
The ECPPA made it clear that Congress intends all use of the Inter-
27net to constitute interstate commerce. Congress responded to the Tenth
Circuit's Schaefer decision in an effort to prevent a similar "misreading"
by a court in the future.28 Later, the Tenth Circuit was asked again to
interpret the child pornography statutes in United States v. Sturm.
In Sturm, the Tenth Circuit was required to interpret the child por-
nography statutes it had previously interpreted in Schaefer.2 9 As was the
defendant in Schaefer, the defendant in Sturm was charged with posses-
sion of child pornography based on pornographic images found on his
hard drive that had been saved while using the Internet.30 Unlike the
Schaefer court, however, this court was acting in the wake of the new
ECPPA, which made it clear that the Schaefer decision was at odds with
the intent of Congress. 3 1 Arguably succumbing to the wishes of Con-
gress, the Sturm court overruled its prior decision in Schaefer.32 In over-
ruling Schaefer, however, the Sturm court did not change its reading of
the statute requiring proof of actual movement across state lines.33 In-
stead, it found a different reading of "visual depiction," 34 allowing the
Tenth Circuit to reach the result Congress intended in a roundabout
way.35 This ruling meant that it is the image portrayed in the digital file
that must move across state lines, rather than the digital file itself.36 The
court even went on to suggest how the Government may prove this nec-
essary interstate element, on remand, by showing that the "substance of
25. Id. at I198.
26. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 ("[R]eversal of a conviction of a man who 'was found to be
in possession of child pornography' on trivial textual grounds... [was] 'a truly unfortunate and
wrongly decided decision."' (quoting Rep. John Conyers Jr., Democrat from Michigan)).
27. Act of Oct. 8, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102(7), 122 Stat. 4001 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012)); see also Frommell, supra note 9.
28. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14.
29. See United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 2012) (en bane).
30. Id. at 896.
31. Compare Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102(7), 122 Stat. 4001 (2008) ("The transmission of
child pornography using the Internet constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.") (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012)), with United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1207 (2007)
(holding that evidence of Internet use was insufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirement of inter-
state commerce).
32. See Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901.
33. Id. at 897.
34. Id. at 900.
35. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing Congress's dissatisfaction with the Tenth
Circuit's strict textual interpretation, contradicting the intent of Congress).
36. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 900 (construing "the term visual depiction to mean the substantive
content of an image"). To further explain the ruling by the court, imagine taking a photograph of
your car in front of your Denver, Colorado house. The photographed car was built at a factory in
Detroit, Michigan. At some point, the car traveled from the factory in Detroit to your house in Den-
ver. Under the Sturm ruling, the physical photograph that you can hold in your hand depicting the
car does not need to travel across state lines. The interstate jurisdictional requirement is met because
the car you photographed was built in a different state and at some point traversed state lines to
arrive in your driveway.
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an image of child pornography was made in a state and/or country other
than the one in which the defendant resides."3 7 The Tenth Circuit's ruling
accomplished two things. First, the court satisfied Congress. 8 Second,
the court remained committed to Schaefer's strict textual interpretation
of the statute by requiring actual interstate movement,39 thereby enabling
the court to continue rejecting the reasoning of the other federal cir-
40cuits-that Internet use constitutes interstate commerce.
B. Why the Previous Framework Was Not Working
The inconsistency the Tenth Circuit exhibited in its interpretation of
an identical statute in Schaefer and Sturm demonstrates a need for
change in how Congress addresses the relationship between law and
technology. Until the Schaefer decision, Congress was pleased with the
interpretations provided by the courts.4 1 Although some scholars have
criticized Congress for not acting sooner,42 there was no need for Con-
gress to act when the decisions were following the intent of Congress.43
The decisions by the Tenth Circuit should not come as a surprise, how-
ever, because courts have long struggled to apply the laws in our new
technological age."
In 1996, the Sixth Circuit was the first to apply obscenity standards
to the Internet.4 5 The standards applied by the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Thomas were established by the Supreme Court in 1973,46 long
before the mainstream adoption of the Internet. 4 7 In Thomas, the Sixth
Circuit attempted to determine what "community standards" it should
apply when Internet users access pornography from different jurisdic-
tions.48 The court ultimately held that "varying community standards"
37. Id. at 901-02.
38. See Sturm, 673 F.3d at 1277 (affirming conviction after remand); see also Sukenik, supra
note 12, at 14 (discussing the negative reaction to the Schaefer decision by members of Congress).
39. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901 ("[T]he Government is ... required to prove that the visual depic-
tion 'has been' . . . transported in interstate . .. commerce at any point in time." (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(2)(B) (2012)); United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The gov-
ernment needed to prove that the images ... moved between states."), overruled by United States v.
Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
40. See Frommell, supra note 9, at 1164 ("[T]he First, Fifth, and Third Circuits . . . embrace
the inference that mere Internet use involves interstate commerce . . . .").
41. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 13 ("Having grown accustomed to the judicial interpreta-
tion furnished by the majority circuits, Congress did not previously have occasion or incentive to
consider whether its statutory drafting failed to account for advances in modern technology.").
42. See id at 31 (noting that Congress decided not to broaden statutory language to clearly
explain congressional intent over the course of several statutory amendments).
43. Id. at 13.
44. Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle over the First Amendment: Can the
Law Really Protect Children from Pornography on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 141, 155 (2003).
45. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1996).
46. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 151 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
47. NSF and the Birth of the Internet-1990s, NAT'L SC. FOUND.,
http://www.nsf.gov/news/specialreports/nsf-net/textonly/90sjsp (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
48. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710-12.
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may apply, which can result in a more conservative standard.49 It remains
unclear, however, whether this idea of community standards is suited for
the Internet due to its pervasiveness.so
The confusion among the courts extends beyond pre-Internet stat-
utes.5 ' In 1996, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act
(CPPA).52 Unlike earlier versions of child pornography statutes, the
CPPA targeted the exploitation of minors that is facilitated by new tech-
nology.53 The CPPA attempted to prohibit the use of technology to create
"virtual child pornography." 54 Even in the current age of everyday tech-
nology use, the courts again were unable to come to a common under-
standing. 5 In the end, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the circuit
split, finding that the law overstepped the protections of the First
Amendment.56
The cases of Schaefer and Sturm further demonstrate the difficulties
the courts have in applying the law in today's world of ever-increasing
technological innovation. Despite their best efforts, the courts have been
unable to consistently apply the law to new technology. 57 A member of
Congress echoed this concern, stating that "[w]e live in a world of very
quickly transforming technology[, and t]he courts sometimes have diffi-
culty keeping up with that."58 This leaves the law unsettled, requiring one
of two things: allowing the courts to continue to stretch existing laws to
new realities or demanding that Congress take action. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's decisions in Schaefer and Sturm demonstrate that leaving courts to
apply outdated laws to new technology is not the best solution in the long
term.59 These inconsistent decisions leave congressional action as the
49. Seeid.at711.
50. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 155-57.
51. Id. at 171.
52. Onmibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252, 2252A, 2256 (2012)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mento, 231
F.3d 912, 915 (4th Cir. 2000); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61,
65 (1st Cir. 1999).
56. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
57. Compare cases cited supra note 16 (holding in each case that use of the Internet alone was
sufficient to show interstate movement), with United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891, 892 (10th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (holding that the Government met its burden of proof by showing "the substantive
content of the images" traveled in interstate commerce), and United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d
1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that proof of Internet use does not prove interstate commerce);
see also Goldstein, supra note 44, at 173 (noting the circuit split interpreting the CPPA); Frommell,
supra note 9, at 1164-65 (discussing the circuit split interpreting child pornography jurisdictional
requirements).
58. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 (first alteration in original) (quoting Rep. Christopher Can-
non, Republican from Utah).
59. See Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901 (overturning Schaefer in the wake of congressional action
amending child pornography statutes).
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only method available to establish clear law to be applied in today's
technology-driven world.
II. WHY CLASSIFYING INTERNET USE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION
Congress's decision to expand federal jurisdiction through the
ECPPA is firmly rooted in the Commerce Clause powers. Commerce
Clause jurisprudence can be traced as far back as 1824. In Gibbons v.
Ogden,60 Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation for Congress's
commerce power, stating that "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it
is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial inter-
course between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is
regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."6' Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause has a history of expanding
with the way business is conducted.6 2 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,63 the Supreme Court held that the right of employees to organize
was a labor practice affecting commerce. 4 In doing so, the Court broke
free from the more limited reach that Congress's commerce power previ-
ously had.65 The Jones & Laughlin decision established the idea that
intrastate activities may affect interstate commerce, thereby recognizing
the power of Congress to regulate local business activities based on the
effect it may have on the national economy. More recently, the Su-
preme Court has clarified the commerce power and its application with
67 6its decisions in United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison, and
Gonzales v. Raich.69 A review of this modem Commerce Clause juris-
prudence will show that the congressional mandate-Internet use consti-
tutes interstate commerce-is supported by the Constitution.70
A. The Federal Government's Powers Under the Commerce Clause
1. Lopez Lays the Groundwork
In Lopez, the Rehnquist-led Court reviewed a century of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence to establish "three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate." 7 1 The first category is the "channels of interstate
60. 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1 (1824).
61. Id. at 189-90.
62. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995).
63. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
64. Id. at 43.
65. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
66. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
67. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
68. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
69. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
70. See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008) (codified throughout 18 U.S.C.); see also Frommell, supra note 9 (noting the new child
pornography statute "equates Internet use with interstate commerce").
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
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commerce."7 2 "Channel" is defined as a waterway, or more precisely, a
"groove through which a stream flows." 7 3 Applying this definition to
interstate commerce, one can logically conclude that a channel of inter-
state commerce is a path, route, or course that commerce may flow or
move through. This application aligns with Supreme Court precedent.74
The second category is the "instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce."75 An "instrumentality" is defined as "a thing used to achieve an
end or purpose."76 The Lopez Court clarified that application of an in-
strumentality to interstate commerce included things used in interstate
commerce, "or persons or things in interstate commerce."7 7 The authority
to regulate instrumentalities under the Commerce Clause extends to in-
trastate activities.
The third category includes those activities that "substantially affect
interstate commerce." 79 The "substantially affects" category applies pri-
marily to those activities that are economic in nature.80 The Lopez Court
identified four factors to determine if an activity substantially affects
interstate commerce: (1) is the statute regulating economic activity? (2)
does the statute have a jurisdictional element limiting its reach to inter-
state commerce? (3) is there legislative history linking the statute to in-
terstate commerce? and (4) is the relationship between the regulated ac-
tivity and interstate commerce "attenuated"?8' Like instrumentalities, the
substantially affects test permits regulation of intrastate activities.82 The
Court went on to explain that although the power to regulate the first two
categories is clear, the power to regulate those activities that fall under
the third category may be murky.
Having established these three categories, the Lopez Court then
turned to the case at hand involving the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
72. Id.
73. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 264 (9th ed. 2009).
74. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 ("[Tihe authority of Congress to keep the channels of inter-
state commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer
open to question." (alteration in original) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491
(1917)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
75. Id.
76. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 73, at 870.
77. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
78. Id. (providing examples such as "destruction of an aircraft, or . .. thefts from interstate
shipments" (alteration in original)).
79. Id. at 558-59.
80. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("While we need not adopt a categor-
ical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases,
thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature.").
81. Id. at 610-12; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 561-62.
82. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 ("[The Court has] upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts





1990.84 Indicating that the Act could only be supported by the third cate-
gory, the Court proceeded to review the Act against the four previously
noted factors to determine if the Act regulated activity that substantially
affected interstate commerce. 86 The Court concluded that the Act failed
under the third category because it "ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce'
- 87or any sort of economic" activity.
2. Lopez Applied in Morrison
The Morrison Court addressed whether the Violence Against Wom-
en Act (VAWA) fell within the third Lopez category.88 VAWA was a
federal law that provided civil remedies to women who were victims of
gender-motivated violence. 89 VAWA, like the statute at issue in Lopez,
was a criminal statute containing no element related to commerce or
economics. 90 Though not ruling out the possibility, the Court concluded
that such, a "noneconomic" statute does not allow for federal regulation
of a purely intrastate activity.9' Thus, as did the Lopez Court, the Morri-
son Court found that the statute lacked the required connection to inter-
state commerce.92
3. Lopez Applied in Raich
In Raich, the Supreme Court was again asked to determine whether
Congress had the power to regulate seemingly non-commercial activity
under the Commerce Clause.93 Raich considered the effects of home-
grown medical marijuana for personal possession and use under the Con-
trolled Substances Act (CSA), and whether the CSA was a valid applica-
tion of the Commerce Clause. 94 Finding significant support from Wick-
ard v. Filburn,95 the Court ruled that there was sufficient connection be-
84. Id. at 551 (making it illegal to possess a gun in a school zone).
85. Id. at 559.
86. Id. at 559, 561-62.
87. Id. at 561.
88. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (reviewing whether VAWA regulat-
ed an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce).
89. Id. at 601-02.
90. Id. at 613.
91. Id. ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in
nature.").
92. Id. at 617-18.
93. See United States v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 8 (2005) ("The Court of Appeals distinguished
prior Circuit cases . .. by focusing on what it deemed to be the 'separate and distinct class of activi-
ties' at issue in this case: the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for
personal medical purposes. . . ." (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
94. Id. at 15.
95. 317 U.S. I 11(1942).
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tween the interstate regulation of marijuana and the homegrown marijua-
96na that the defendant was using.
As was the statute in Wickard, the CSA was enacted to control the
interstate market of controlled substances, such as marijuana.9 7 Reason-
ing that purely intrastate wheat production and consumption would affect
the interstate market for wheat, the Wickard Court concluded that Con-
gress had a "rational basis" for regulating intrastate wheat activity.98
Here, the Raich Court came to the same conclusion, stating that "failure
to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would
leave a gaping hole in the CSA."99
These cases establish the current scope and reach of what may be
regulated under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, the cases demon-
strate that the federal government may regulate purely intrastate activity
so long as the thing being regulated has an economic effect on interstate
commerce. As will be explained below, the Internet has come to play a
vital role in personal and commercial economic activity, thereby lending
itself to be fully regulatedunder the Commerce Clause.
B. The Commerce Power Applied to the Internet Under Lopez
To understand how the commerce power applies to the Internet, we
first must determine which category it falls under. As summarized above,
the Lopez Court established three areas of interstate commerce that Con-
gress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: channels, instrumentali-
ties, and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The In-
ternet arguably falls within all three Lopez categories: channels, instru-
mentalities, and substantial effect. Although only one category is needed
to enable Congress to regulate, an activity must fall outside all three cat-
egories to escape Congress's commerce power. 00 These categories, and
their application to the Internet, will be examined below.
1. The Internet as a Channel
A channel of interstate commerce is a path, route, or course that
commerce may flow or move through.' 0 ' Traditional examples of inter-
state commerce channels are rivers, highways, and railways.' 02 If yOu go
96. Raich, 545 U.S. at 32-33.
97. Id. at 18-19 ("Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act [in Wickard| was designed 'to
control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surplus-
es. . .' and consequently control the market price, a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the
supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets." (second
alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115)).
98. Id. at 19.
99. Id at 22.
100. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
101. See supra Part 1lAl..
102. Nathaniel H. Clark, Comment, Tangled in a Web: The Difficulty of Regulating Intrastate
Internet Transmissions Under the Interstate Commer.e Clause, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 947, 954
(2009).
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to your local electronics retail store and purchase a television, you have
participated in interstate commerce because prior to you purchasing the
television, it was manufactured and delivered to your local electronics
retail store, most likely by highway. Although your purchase of the tele-
vision was entirely intrastate, it traveled through a channel of interstate
commerce, the highway, to reach you.
Much like the path of the television in the example above, the Inter-
net is a channel of interstate commerce, one that continues to grow in
popularity.10 3 The Internet allows you to connect with people and busi-
nesses worldwide. Each transmission you send or receive over the Inter-
net is transported through various computer networks to reach its intend-
ed destination.'" Although there are many non-commercial, personal
uses of the Internet, more people than ever are turning to the Internet to
conduct business.'0o One example of this is Internet shopping, or e-
commerce. E-commerce is the business of buying and selling goods or
services via the Internet.'0 6 The goods being purchased may include a
television or a software product that is sent to you electronically. In ei-
ther case, you have used the Internet as a channel of interstate commerce.
2. The Internet as an Instrumentality
As established in Lopez, an instrumentality is something used in in-
terstate commerce "or persons or things in interstate commerce.' 0 7 The
Supreme Court has previously stated that "railroads, highways, and
bridges constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce."' These
examples seem to describe some of the channels just discussed. But it is
important to note that a channel can be an instrumentality, and vice ver-
sa.109
The Internet meets the definition of instrumentality as does a high-
way, railroad, or bridge, being both a channel and instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce. We can use each of these as a tool to traverse state
and national boundaries, but each one is also a path that commerce tray-
103. Internet World Stats-Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNETWORLDSTATS.COM,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated Jan. 17, 2013) (citing world growth of
Internet use at 566.4% between 2000 and 2012).
104. See generally United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining
the process of routing Internet traffic); Clark, supra note 102, at 952-53 (explaining the process for
intrastate Internet transmissions).
105. Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, The Internet is 20% of Economic Growth, BUS. INSIDER
INTELLIGENCE (May 24, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/mckinsey-report-internet-
economy-2011-5?op=1 (noting the Internet represents over 20% of economic growth during the last
five years).
106. Rifat Azam, E-Commerce Taxation and Cyberspace Law: The Integrative Adaptation
Model, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 14 (2007).
107. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
108. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588 (3d Cir. 1995).
109. See MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245 (concluding that the "Internet is an instrumentality and
channel of interstate commerce"); see also 15 C.J.S. COMMERCE § 110 (2012) ("The Internet is
generally an instrumentality and a channel of interstate commerce.").
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els through. The Internet meets this dual classification because of the
Internet's nature as being both the thing we use to buy a DVD, and the
network of channels that the payment information we use to purchase the
DVD travels through.
Identifying the Internet as an instrumentality of interstate commerce
in this manner is not a novel concept. 0 Contrary to the views of some,"'
numerous courts have established that the Internet is an instrumentality
112of interstate commerce,l with some going so far as to say that finding
something more "intertwined" with interstate commerce would be "diffi-
cult."' '3 Although the Supreme Court has not expressly declared that the
Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce, several cases de-
cided by the Court concerning other interstate facilities support the prop-
osition that the Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce.14 In
addition to the courts, many scholars have supported the idea that the
Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce." 5 Thus, it seems
evident that the Internet meets the definition of an instrumentality of
interstate commerce.
3. Use of the Internet Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce
The substantially affects test focuses on economic activity." 6 As the
Morrison Court put it, "While we need not adopt a categorical rule
against aggregating ... noneconomic activity..., thus far in our Na-
tion's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of in-
trastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.""'7 If the
activity is shown to substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress
may regulate such activity even if it is purely local in nature." 8 We now
turn to the factors discussed in Lopez to determine if the Internet substan-
tially affects interstate commerce.
110. See sources cited supra note 109.
111. See Clark, supra note 102, at 958-59 (identifying a computer or mobile device as the
instrumentality used to access the Internet).
112. United States v. Faris, 583 F.3d 756, 759 (1lth Cir. 2009); Utah Lighthouse Ministry v.
Found. for Apologetic Info. & Res., 527 F.3d 1045, 1054 (10th Cir. 2008); MacEwan, 445 F.3d at
245.
113. MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245.
114. Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation of
the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889, 904 n. 102 (1998) (citing Fed. Power
Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 94 (1965) (holding the transmission of electricity is sub-
ject to commerce power); Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 427 (1963)
(holding that radio station broadcasts over state lines constitute interstate commerce)).
115. See Frances E. Zollers et al., Fighting Internet Fraud: Old Scams, Old Laws, New Con-
text, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 169, 181 (2002); Bassinger, supra note 114, at 926; Greg Y.
Sato, Note, Should Congress Regulate Cyberspace?, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 699, 716
(1998).
116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
118. See supra note 82.
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To reiterate, the Lopez Court identified four factors to help deter-
mine if an activity substantially affects interstate commerce: (1) is the
statute regulating economic activity? (2) does the statute have a jurisdic-
tional element limiting its reach to interstate commerce? (3) is there leg-
islative history linking the statute to interstate commerce? and (4) is the
relationship between the regulated activity and interstate commerce "at-
tenuated"?' 19 I will apply these factors to the ECPPA to better illustrate
how the Internet substantially affects interstate commerce.
First, is the ECPPA regulating economic activity? The ECPPA was
enacted to combat the receipt, possession, and distribution of child por-
nography. 120 As early as 2005, the child pornography industry was esti-
mated to be a $3 billion per year industry.12 1 In 2006, worldwide pornog-
raphy revenues reached $97.06 billion.122 That same year, revenues for
Internet pornography in the United States reached $2.84 billion, or
21.3% of the entire United States pornography market.123 Additionally,
about 20% of all Internet pornography involves children.124 These figures
make it very clear that child pornography is a thriving economic indus-
try. But can these figures serve as the basis for holding that the ECPPA is
actually regulating economic activity? To answer this question, compare
the ECPPA with the statute in Lopez that dealt with the "possession of a
gun in a local school zone." 2 5 The Lopez statute did not deal with the
receipt or distribution of a gun, whereas the ECPPA expressly mentions
receipt and distribution of child pornography.' 26 By mentioning receipt
and distribution, the ECPPA is connected to an activity that "through
repetition" may substantially affect interstate commerce.12 7 Possession of
anything alone, without considering its movement, provides no "tie to
interstate commerce." 2 8 This difference, although small, provides the
"economic activity that might . . . substantially affect . . . interstate com-
merce" and does not require courts "to pile inference upon inference" as
did the statute in Lopez.12 9 For these reasons, the ECPPA regulates an
economic activity.
119. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012), amended by Child Protection Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
206, 126 Stat. 1490 (2012) (codified throughout 42 U.S.C.).
121. Statistics on Pornography, Sexual Addiction and Online Perpetrators,
SAFEFAMILIES.ORG, http://www.safefamilies.org/sf5tats.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter
Statistics on Pornography].
122. Jerry Ropelato, Internet Pornography Statistics, TOPTENREVIEWS.COM, http://internet-
filter-review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pomography-statistics.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
123. Id.
124. Statistics on Pornography, supra note 121.
125. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
126. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2012) (making it illegal "for any individual to ...
possess a firearm i[n] a school zone"), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (2012) ("Any person who ...
receives or distributes . . . any child pornography .... shall be punished. . .
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Second, does the ECPPA have a jurisdictional element limiting it to
interstate commerce? The ECPPA prohibits the use of "any means or
facility of interstate commerce" or "in or affecting interstate" commerce
in connection with child pornography. 130 These elements effectively limit
the reach of the ECPPA by excluding the intrastate possession and deliv-
ery of child pornography because the Act requires child pornography to
have a relationship with interstate commerce.' 3 1 This is unlike the statute
in Lopez that sought to regulate any possession of a gun in a school zone,
regardless of any connection to interstate commerce.132 Therefore, the
ECPPA is limited to the receipt, possession, and distribution of child
pornography that has an "explicit connection with" interstate com-
merce.133
Third, is there legislative history linking the ECPPA to interstate
commerce? Prior to passing the ECPPA, Congress established that child
pornography was "estimated to be a multibillion dollar industry."l 34 Fur-
thermore, Congress realized the danger that the Internet presented in
making child pornography easily accessible, and even commented that
"[tlhe Lnternet is . . . a method of distributing goods and services across
State lines." 35 Congress concluded that "transmission of child pornogra-
phy using the. Internet constitutes transportation in interstate com-
merce." 36 Having shown that the child pornography industry is worth
billions of dollars, and that use of the Internet is a known method of de-
livering child pornography, one can conclude that there is a connection
between the ECPPA and interstate commerce.
Fourth, to what degree is the relationship between regulated activity
and interstate commerce attenuated? This question almost requires a lim-
it to be articulated on the reach of the federal power under the statute. 37
The ECPPA has provided for limited reach by expressly stating that use
of the Internet constitutes interstate commerce.' 38 Using the Internet to
obtain and search for child pornography would fall under the ECPPA,
whereas would-be criminals that receive, possess, or distribute images of
child pornography through purely local sources would not be liable under
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2012); see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1166-67.
131. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (discussing the failure of the statute in Lopez to have a juris-
dictional element because possession of a firearm alone does not have a "nexus to interstate com-
merce," and without it there is no "limit [to] its reach").
132. Id. at 561-62.
133. See id. at 562 (discussing why the statute in Lopez failed under the Commerce Clause).
"Unlike the statute in Bass, [the statute in Lopez] has no express jurisdictional element which might
limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. (emphasis added).
134. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102(l), 122
Stat. 4001 (2008) (codified throughout 18 U.S.C.).
135. Id. § 102(6).
136. Id. § 102(7).
137. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (discussing the ramifications if
the Court were to follow the "but-for causal chain" presented by the Government).
138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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the ECPPA.139 Therefore, a clear separation between federal and state
prosecution exists under the ECPPA.
The Internet has an almost infinite number of uses, and this analysis
of the ECPPA was just one example of how the Internet may be used in a
manner that substantially affects interstate commerce. The Internet can
be found in many areas of commercial activity.140 Whether that commer-
cial activity is local in nature or not, it does not change the fact that your
use affects commerce internationally.141 And as Wickard plainly estab-
lished decades ago, "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is
plenary" and if "activities intrastate ... so affect interstate commerce"
then "the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities."l 4 2
C. Internet Use Is Interstate Commerce
Understanding how the Internet fits into the Lopez categories, we
can now turn to the amount of power Congress has to regulate its use. It
is well-settled law that Congress has plenary power under the Commerce
Clause, enabling Congress to regulate both interstate and intrastate ac-
tivities. 14 3 This plenary power includes the ability to regulate both chan-
nels and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.144 Hav-
ing established that the Internet is a channel,14 5 an instrumentality,146 and
that use of the Internet substantially affects interstate commerce,14 7 it is
unequivocal that the Internet is inherently interstate in nature and thus
may be regulated by Congress to the fullest extent of its Commerce
Clause powers.148
Although the Internet has previously been recognized as being suf-
ficient for exercising federal regulation,14 9 skepticism still exists as to
whether mere use of the Internet constitutes interstate commerce.1o As
139. By limiting the reach of the ECPPA to the Internet, a person who snapped pictures of his
or her neighbor's minor daughter engaged in sexual conduct would not be liable under the ECPPA if
those pictures were kept or distributed locally without the assistance of the Internet but may be liable
under state laws.
140. See generally Steve Schifferes, How the Internet Transformed Business, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2006, 11:53 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5235332.stm (noting the history of
the Internet and its broad penetration into business).
141. See id.
142. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
143. Michele Martinez Campbell, The Kids Are Online: The Internet, the Commerce Clause,
and the Amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 215, 244 (2011) ("Congress's
Commerce Clause authority . . . includes the power to reach purely intrastate conduct.").
144. Compare id at 245 ("[C]ongressional power to regulate the channels ... of commerce
includes ... purely local [activities]." (quoting United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11 th
Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 (explaining the com-
merce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce").
145. See supra Part II.B.1.
146. See supra Part II.B.2.
147. See supra Part II.B.3.
148. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
149. 2 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 9:12 (2012) ("[V]irtually all uses of Inter-
net and Internet-related services have an interstate component . . .
150. See Clark, supra note 102, at 959-60.
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this Part explains, it is hard to think of the Internet as being anything but
interstate. After all, the Internet is known as the "information superhigh-
way," 5 ' a "spiderweb-like" network of computers that facilitates com-
munication and business worldwide.15 2
III. THE BENEFITS OF CLASSIFYING INTERNET USE
AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In passing the ECPPA, Congress sent a clear message: "[U]sing the
Internet constitutes ... interstate commerce."15 3 The mandate, though not
without its critics, 154 ensures that mistakes in applying the law to the In-
ternet will no longer lead to questionable decisions in child pornography
cases.'5 5 This mandate, however, should not be limited to child pornog-
raphy laws. Instead, it should be adopted in all federal statutes because
many federal statutes suffer from the same problem child pornography
laws faced before Congress enacted the ECPPA-When is interstate
commerce triggered? For example, take the recent Second Circuit case of
United States v. Aleynikov.15 6 Aleynikov was a programmer employed by
Goldman Sachs.15 7 While at Goldman Sachs, he developed a software
product to facilitate high-speed trading of securities and commodities. '1
Aleynikov later left Goldman Sachs for a position at a different firm, but
before leaving, he took the trading platform's source code with him to
his new employer.159 Aleynikov was later charged with stealing the trad-
ing platform under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), among
other things.'60 The EEA prohibits the conversion of another's trade se-
cret "that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or
placed in interstate ... commerce."' 6 ' The Second Circuit, focusing on
this interstate commerce element, decided that the source code did not
constitute a product "produced for or placed in interstate ... com-
merce."l 62 The court based its reasoning on the fact that Congress had
used limiting language and did not "purport to exercise the full scope of
151. Jeffrey Kahn, Building and Rescuing the Information Superhighway, LBL RES. REV.,
Summer 1993, at 10, 10.
152. Id. at I1.
153. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008) (codified throughout 18 U.S.C.); see also Frommell, supra note 9.
154. See Clark, supra note 102, passim; see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1172-73.
155. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 (noting Congress's reaction to the Schaefer decision).
156. 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012).
157. Id.at73.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 74.
160. Id at 73-75 (noting other charges under the National Stolen Property Act and under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
161. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 1832(a), 110 Stat. 3488 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012)).
162. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 73 (quoting Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
294, § 1832(a), 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012))) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
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[its] congressional authority" under the Commerce Clause.163 Agreeing
with the majority's explanation, Judge Calabresi questioned if the court
had given effect to Congress's intent and requested Congress to revisit
the statute to make its intention clear.'1 On December 20, 2012, Judge
Calabresi's request was answered when an amendment to the EEA was
enacted to include any "product or service used in or intended for use in"
interstate commerce,16 5 providing perhaps the answer to Judge Calabre-
si's question of Congress's actual intent under the EEA.16 6 Although the
Aleynikov decision did not deal directly with whether the trading plat-
form itself had entered interstate commerce, the court was still grappling
with whether the interstate commerce element of the EEA was satis-
fled.' 67 As Aleynikov illustrates, regardless of what cybercrime statute is
at issue, the idea remains the same: Congress needs to make it clear that
Internet use constitutes interstate commerce and do so before another
"alleged misreading" of a cybercrime statute takes place. 68
I have identified two benefits provided by Congress's mandate in
the ECPPA that Internet use constitutes interstate commerce. First, it will
provide clear instruction to the courts, yielding more predictable results.
Second, it will bring certainty to the laws, resulting in prosecutions that
are more effective. Although the discussion of these benefits below is in
the context of child pornography, the benefits could be experienced in all
federal cases if the mandate-Internet use constitutes interstate com-
merce-were adopted in all federal laws.
A. Clear Instruction for the Courts
The language in the prior child pornography statutes left the courts
to interpret the scope of its reach. 69 To interpret the statute, courts fo-
cused on the jurisdictional language contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)
and § 2252(a)(4)(B), specifically whether child pornography "has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce ... by any means including by computer."o70 Despite the seeming-
ly clear intent of this statute,171 the language prompted confusion among
the courts-When does Internet child pornography constitute interstate
163. Id at 81.
164. Id at 83 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
165. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, S. Res. 3642, 112th Cong. (enacted).
166. See Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 83 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 79-83 (majority opinion).
168. See id. at 83 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (questioning whether the court reached the deci-
sion Congress intended); see also Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 ("Congress ... criticiz[ed] ... the
[Schaefer] court's alleged misreading of legislative intent.").
169. Frommell, supra note 9, at 1163-66 (discussing the split among the federal courts of
appeals).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) (2012); see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1159.
171. See Frommell, supra note 9, at 1163-64 (showing a consensus among the federal courts of
appeals in equating Internet use with interstate commerce).
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commerce?1 72 To address this question, Congress enacted a new version
of the statute, removing any hint of guesswork.1 3
The new statute, in relevant part, reads "any person who . . . re-
ceives or distributes any child pornography that has been mailed, or us-
ing any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce shipped or
transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer."l7 4 By amending the language as it did, Congress
made it clear to the courts that it intended the statute to reach the full
extent of Congress's Commerce Clause power.'17  Using traditional
Commerce Clause buzzwords such as "any means or facility" and "in or
affecting,"' 76 Congress answered the call from the Tenth Circuit in
Schaefer demanding more precise language. 177
In demanding specific language, the Tenth Circuit seemingly relied
exclusively upon the strictest of textual interpretations, giving no
weight to any of the other established canons of statutory interpreta-
tion. 17 9 The court's reliance on this textual interpretation resulted in the
Tenth Circuit handing down a decision that even a concurring member of
the court admitted was incorrect.'80 Although some of the blame should
be placed on the prosecution,18' the majority of the blame rests with the
court, which ultimately made the decision, going against the other cir-
cuits to overturn a conviction that should have been upheld. 82
Five years later in Sturm, the Tenth Circuit was again asked to in-
terpret the child pornography laws it had interpreted in Schaefer.1 83 Un-
like Schaefer, however, the Sturm court ruled in favor of the Government
by redefining the term "visual depiction" in the statute to mean the "sub-
stantive content of an image." 8 4 Prior to Sturm, courts focused on the
172. See id. at 1166 (discussing the split in the federal courts of appeals following the Schaefer
decision).
173. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008) (codified throughout 18 U.S.C.); see also Frommell, supra note 9 ("The updated legis-
lation unambiguously equates Internet use with interstate commerce . . .
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2012).
175. See id; see also Frommell, supra note 9.
176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
177. See United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Congress's use
of the 'in commerce' language, as opposed to phrasing such as 'affecting commerce' or a 'facility of
interstate commerce,' signals its decision to limit federal jurisdiction . . . ."), overruled by United
States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
178. See id; see also Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 ("Congress moved quickly . .. , criticizing
... the textual-interpretation methodology .... ).
179. See Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretative Methodologies, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1972-78 (2007) (discussing some of the common methods of statutory
interpretation).
180. See Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1207 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) ("I have no doubt the images
traveled across state and national borders.").
181. Frommell, supra note 9, at 1161-62 (discussing the failures of the prosecution).
182. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1204-05 (majority opinion).
183. United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891, 898 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
184. Id. at 901.
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digital file or tangible media itself that contained the image, not the sub-
stance of the image it contained.'8 ' By redefining "visual depiction," the
Tenth Circuit was able to stick to its interpretation in Schaefer requiring
proof of actual interstate movement by holding that the "substantive con-
tent of an image" must move in interstate commerce.' 86 This interpreta-
tion by the court resulted in the outcome Congress intended,18 7 albeit in a
way that is arguably not how Congress intended. 8
The Tenth Circuit's inconsistency in interpreting the same statute is
prima facie evidence that a congressional mandate was needed. Congress
delivered the needed clarity in the ECPPA, leaving no doubt how the
courts should read the new law.189 This mandate benefits the courts and
the public by adding predictability in the outcome of cases dealing with
child pornography and the Internet.
B. Prosecutions that Are More Effective
Prosecutorial success should be measured by its effectiveness in
carrying out the legislative intent that Congress had when passing a spe-
cific law.' 90 This is, after all, how our government is supposed to work-
giving effect to a law based on the intent of our democratically elected
members of Congress.' 9 ' The intent of child pornography laws has re-
mained the same over the years: punish those individuals who receive,
possess, or distribute child pornography.192 Prior to Schaefer, to obtain a
conviction under the child pornography laws, the Government needed
only to show that the defendant used the Internet to obtain child pornog-
raphy. 93 Relying on this common theme from other courts,' 94 the Gov-
ernment presented evidence in Schaefer to prove that the defendant used
the Internet to obtain child pornography.195 Unbeknownst to the Gov-
185. See, e.g., Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1205 ("[T]he government needed to prove the visual
images ... moved across state lines."); see also supra note 7.
186. Sturm, 672 F.3d at 901.
187. See Sukenik, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing the disgust of Congress over the decision in
Schaefer).
188. See id. (commenting that Congress intended Internet use to constitute interstate com-
merce).
189. Id. at 15.
190. See id. at 14 (quoting several members of Congress who criticized the decision in
Schaefer because the court's interpretation went against alleged legislative intent).
191. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
("If a court ... ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that inten-
tion is the law and must be given effect.").
192. See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2012),
amended by Child Protection Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-206, 126 Stat. 1490 (codified throughout
42 U.S.C.); see also Frommell, supra note 9, at 1156-58 (discussing the history and expansion of
federal child pornography laws and the common goal of punishing those who deal in child pornog-
raphy).
193. Frommell, supra note 9, at 1164-65.
194. See cases cited supra note 16.
195. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The government main-
tains that this evidence was sufficient to establish the interstate commerce element because it permit-
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ernment, however, the Schaefer court would require proof that the imag-
es actually moved between states to uphold a conviction.196 Following
the Schaefer decision, the Government had to consider the relevant juris-
diction to determine the amount of evidence required to prove the inter-
state component of the child pornography laws. 197 Congress's mandate in
the ECPPA-equating Internet use with interstate commerce-
established a clear standard for proving interstate commerce, removing a
key hurdle to effective prosecution. 198
In United States v. Carroll,'99 the First Circuit interpreted the juris-
dictional requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).20 0 To secure a conviction
under this child pornography statute, the Government needed to show
that the defendant "knew or had reason to know" that the child pornogra-
phy "would be transported in interstate commerce." 2 0 1 The Government
relied on the testimony of the victim indicating that the defendant intend-
ed to upload images to a computer and "distribute them on the Inter-
net." 202 The court said that such transmission "by means of the Internet"
203
would satisfy the statutory interstate commerce requirement.
The Fifth Circuit followed the First Circuit's lead and came to a
204similar conclusion in United States v. Runyan. Runyan was indicted on
four separate charges.2 0 5 The first charge was based on the same provi-
sion at issue in Carroll, whereas the remaining three were under a differ-
ent section of the child pornography laws, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 206 The
Runyan court agreed with the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 ad-
vanced by the First Circuit. 207 Turning to the charges under § 2252A, the
Government offered Runyan's confession as proof that the images of
208child pornography were in interstate commerce.28 Runyan admitted that
the images of child pornography he possessed came from the Internet.209
ted a reasonable fact-finder to determine that the images of child pornography . . were obtained
from the Internet."), overruled by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
196. Id ("[I]t was not enough for the government to prove that the child-pornography images
... were obtained from the Internet. The government needed to prove that the images ... moved
between states.").
197. Frommell, supra note 9.
198. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 15.
199. 105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997).
200. Id at 741-42.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 742.
203. Id.
204. 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002).
205. Id. at 238.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 239 ("We join the First Circuit in holding that '[t]ransmission of photographs by
means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes
transportation in interstate commerce' for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 .") (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir.1997)).
208. Id. at 241.
209. Id.
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Finding that this confession was sufficient to link the images to the Inter-
net, the court upheld Runyan's conviction.2 10
Finally, in United States v. MacEwan ,21 the Third Circuit came to a
similar verdict.2 12 MacEwan was charged with receiving child pornogra-
phy under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B).2 13 After seizing MacEwan's
computers, the Government found over 250 images of child pornography
along with links to child pornography websites in his Internet history.2 14
The Government attempted to prove that these images were in interstate
commerce from expert testimony that "summarized the flow of data over
the Internet."2 15 This testimony noted the mere possibility that transmis-
sion of data over the Internet could cross state lines.216 The Third Circuit
concluded that because of the "very interstate nature of the Internet,"
proof of Internet use to download images of child pornography was
enough to show the images had "traveled in interstate commerce." 217
Following these decisions, the burden on the Government was clear:
show the child pornography images were linked to the Internet and the
interstate commerce requirement will be satisfied.2 18 However, the Tenth
Circuit rejected this notion in Schaefer, abandoning nonbinding, persua-
sive precedent.2 19 Despite a showing by the Government in Schaefer that
the defendant had "subscribe[d] to websites containing images of child
pornography" and that child pornography images were found on his
computer,220 the Tenth Circuit held that this evidence was insufficient
proof of interstate commerce, instead requiring evidence that the images
of child pornography actually moved "across state lines." 221 This incon-
sistent burden of proof requirement not only resulted in an acquittal in
210. Id at 242-43.
211. 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006).
212. Id at 239.
213. Id
214. Id. at 240.
215. Id. at 241.
216. See id. at 241-42.
217. Id. at 244.
218. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 9 ("The majority of circuits ... held that evidence of Internet
use alone satisfied the jurisdictional requirement in the statute.").
219. Compare United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
actual movement across state lines is required), overruled by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891
(10th Cir. 2012) (en banc), with MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 244 (holding that use of the Internet is suffi-
cient evidence to show interstate activity), and United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 242 (5th Cir.
2002) ("[Clircumstantial evidence linking a[n] ... image to the Internet . . . can be sufficient evi-
dence of interstate transportation . . , ."), and United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir.
1997) ("Transmission ... by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving . . . across state lines and
thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.").
220. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198.
221. Id. at 1201.
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Schaefer222 but also highlighted potential difficulties in prosecuting crim-
- - 223mals in the Internet age.
Congress's mandate that Internet use constitutes interstate com-
merce eases the difficulty in prosecuting child pornography crimes in-
volving the Internet. 224 This will ultimately result in prosecutions that are
more effective because the burden of proof is clear.22 5 Additionally,
prosecutorial efficiency will improve because proving Internet use is far
easier than explaining the intricacies of how data moves over the Inter-
net.226 After all, it is the guilt or innocence of a party that should be of
primary concern, not deciphering expert testimony about the particular
path a specific image or data file followed through the elaborate world-
wide network of the Internet.
CONCLUSION
In Schaefer, a man who admitted to searching for child pornography
was set free because a court made a decision with blinders on. Taking
quick action, Congress amended the statute to ensure similar, shortsight-
ed decisions would not occur in the future. The Tenth Circuit, realizing
its mistake, overturned Schaefer, and with it found a new way to interpret
the law. But its Sturm decision ended up being just another example of
the dangers involved in allowing courts the opportunity to use their statu-
tory interpretation canon of choice.
The congressional mandate in the Effective Child Pornography
Prosecution Act of 2007 stating that "using the Internet constitutes trans-
portation in interstate commerce" should be extended to all federal laws.
It allows for predictability in the courts and more consistent prosecutions
of alleged criminals. This mandate is not outside the powers granted to
the federal government by the Constitution. The Internet is an inherently
interstate mode of communication and method to transport data. Let's
222. Id. at 1207.
223. Id. ("The development and growth of the Internet . . . complicates the statutory analysis in
this case.")
224. Sukenik, supra note 12, at 15 ("Congress's legislation ... clariffied] the appropriate
juriAictional standard to be applied . . .
225. See id.
226. See generally United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 241 (explaining the process of
routing Internet traffic); Clark, supra note 102, at 952-53 (explaining the process for intrastate
Intk -net transmissions).
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enter the twenty-first century by declaring all Internet use as interstate
commerce.
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